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Abstract
We argue for the creation of a carbon liabilities market to address
climate change. Each period, countries would be made liable for their
share of responsibility in current climate damage. Because liabilities could
be traded like nancial debt, robustness to strategic manipulations and
e¢ ciency ensue. Moreover, this decentralizes the choice of the rate by
which countries discount future benets and damage. Rather than being
based on an expected discounted sum of future marginal damage (as with
a carbon tax or tradable emission permits) our proposal relies only on
observed realized damage and on the well-documented emission history of
countries.
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1 Introduction
Climate policies that rely on economic instruments, such as emissions taxes
or cap-and-trade programs, exact immediate payments on the basis that cli-
mate damage will occur in the future. In principle, an optimal carbon tax asks
emitters to pay today the expected discounted marginal damage of emissions,
according to some climate damage scenarios over the next decades, sometimes
centuries that may or may not materialize. Likewise, the number of tradable
permits issued in an e¢ cient cap-and-trade programs is also contingent on said
scenarios, e¤ectively costing emitters the full expected consequences of their
emissions ows upon emitting. Should these scenarios or mankinds responsi-
bility in them prove inaccurate, such anticipatory schemes would cause needless
disruptions to the economy.
Instead, we argue in favor of holding countries liable for climate damage
arising from their greenhouse gas emissions through the creation of a market for
liabilities. Concretely, emitting CO2 in the atmosphere1 would be accompanied
by the issuance of a carbon liability : a legal duty for the bearer to pay damages
over time as climate damage occurs.2 In other words, the bearers of carbon
liabilities would be repaying their debt to the world in installments rather than
upfront. Carbon liabilities would not expire, but would instead decay at the
same rate as atmospheric CO2, all the while holding its bearers accountable for
paying carbon damages as climate damage occurs. Carbon liabilities could be
sold to other countries, by paying them to honor their newly acquired responsi-
bility in future climate damage.3 Free trade on the global market would ensure
e¢ ciency.
The idea of using liabilities as a means to controlling externalities traces back
1For expositional purposes, we shall speak only in terms of CO2.
2Clearly, the issue of determining the magnitude of anthropogenic climate damage is a
di¢ cult one. Note, however, that this question is by no means resolved with a carbon tax.
In fact it is made even worse, because estimating the value of the damage caused by a ton
of carbon emitted today decades or centuries into the future is a much more heroic feat than
assessing the responsibility of past emissions in (observed) damage ocurring today. Yet, very
few objections to the carbon tax seem to be raised on those grounds.
3Thanks to the nanciarisation of climate liabilities, carbon damages would add to the
national debt. Therefore, there is no reason to be more concerned by countries defaulting on
the payment of carbon damages than by their defaulting on the repayment of national debt.
However, there is a di¤erence in the nature of these debts. In the unlikely case of default on
nancial debt, those a¤ected are creditors who chose to expose themselves to nancial risk.
By contrast, those a¤ected by default on carbon debt are likely to be residents of vulnerable
countries that did not choose to expose themselves to climate risk. We thank Yann Kervinio
for this observation.
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to Calabresi (1970) and was recently compared to corrective taxation in Shavell
(2011). On the one hand, regulation (taxation) is costly even in the absence
of damage, whereas a liability approach only kicks in when harm actually oc-
curs. On the other hand, a liability approach is typically more informationally
demanding because it requires establishing tort (Kolstad et al, 1990; Shavell,
2011). Hence, a liability approach is likely to be more appropriate in situations
where damage is highly uncertain but where its source can be easily established.
This is precisely the case of climate change, where the magnitude of damage is
typically unknown but the responsibility of countries towards CO2 concentra-
tion can be readily established thanks to available data on cumulated CO2
emissions per country (e.g., from the World Resource Institute or the World
Bank databases).4
2 E¢ ciency
Let fDtg+1t=0 =
P
iD
i
t
	+1
t=0
denote the ow of stochastic damage borne by all
countries, indexed by i, as attached to anthropogenic climate change. At any
period t, the occurrence and the magnitude of this damage is assumed to be
an increasing function of Zt, the current stock of anthropogenic CO2 in the
atmosphere. Our proposal consists in converting CO2 emissions into nancial
debt. More precisely, in each period, all countries are required to contribute
to an international climate fund to the tune of tZ
j
t where t = dDt=dZt is
the marginal climate damage due to anthropogenic emissions5 and where Zjt =Pt
s= 1 
sXjs is the contribution of country j to the stock Zt (it is the discounted
sum of its past emissions Xjs , for all s  t, accounting for their natural decay
at rate 1  ).6
4The liability approach is usually discussed in the context of tort law, involving private par-
ties and legal costs attached to lawsuits, to establishing due care and negligence. By contrast,
the liability approach we consider here is public, in the sense that it involves countries, and
would consist in an automatic procedure where the negligence rule plays no role. Countries
would be held responsible for climate damage according to their past emissions.
5Unlike in tort law, we do not aim for "full liability" because it is not optimal to cover all
the costs. Rather, we require countries to pay for the marginal damage they induce, hence
our use of the phrase "e¢ cient carbon liabilities".
6 It is actually not required to trace back emissions to innity. In fact, accounting only
for, say, post-1990 emissions would result in the very same emissions pattern. Indeed, the
truncation simply amounts to lump-sum transfers to countries while preserving incentives at
the margin.
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Proposition 1 Under the usual Pigovian assumptions that no single agent has
an impact on the marginal damage,7 such a carbon debt scheme yields rst-best
emission patterns.
Proof. Under rational expectations, country i evaluates its present net
benet as:
Bi =
+1X
t=0
t

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  tZit ; (1)
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is the per-period benet of country i resulting from its emissions
in the current period. Country i then chooses an emissions stream
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under the assumption that no single agent has an impact on marginal damage.
Each country equalizes its marginal benet with the expected discounted value
of marginal climate damage, thus achieving rst-best e¢ ciency.
Notice that the only information required of the planner to implement our
scheme, on top of the well-documented emission history of countries, is t =
dDt
dZt
:
the marginal impact of current anthropogenic CO2 concentration on the current
ow of climate damage. While obtaining this information accurately may be no
small task, it seems far less daunting to be working with observed data than with
predictions over future decades or centuries. Indeed, the information required to
implement an e¢ cient carbon tax,  , or the equivalent cap-and-trade program
is the expected, discounted sum of the marginal impacts of current emissions on
future climate damage:
 t = Et
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From a policy standpoint, implementing our carbon debt policy is simpler
than implementing a cap-and-trade program. Under our scheme, carbon debt is
issued and allocated systematically based on each countrys observed emissions.
7We shall work under this assumption throughout. It follows that we shall ignore strategic
issues associated with the relative size of countries as discussed in the next section.
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By contrast, cap-and-trade schemes require a planner to issue and allocate per-
mits with the obvious risks of miscalculation and misallocation, respectively.
The upshot of requiring less of the planner is that much more freedom is left
to the countries, thus allowing for more decentralization than, say, a harmonized
carbon tax policy or a global cap-and-trade program.8 Specically, countries
make their own predictions about future damage and work with their own dis-
count factors. However, there is a limit to decentralization: making rms liable
would increase default risk and lead to skewed incentives. By contrast, assigning
liabilities at the country level ensures solvability and correct incentives because
nations are long-lived. In addition, this gives countries sovereignty on how to
nance their carbon damages.
Section 3 addresses how trade can maintain e¢ ciency in the case where
countries have di¤erent discount factors and di¤erent expectations about future
anthropogenic climate damage.
3 Robustness
If debt can be traded, our approach is robust to heterogeneity in discount factors
and to diverging forecasts. If discount factors and forecasts are country-specic
Expression (2) becomes:
@Bit
@Xit
= Eit
"
+1X
s=t
(i)
s t
s
#
where i and E
i
t are the discount factor and the expectations of country i,
respectively.
Country heterogeneity yields trade opportunities: a market for debt leaves
it to countries to determine how much debt they wish to hold based on their
predictions of future climate change damage. Should opinions di¤er on the
likelihood and magnitude of future damage, or on the discount rate, e¢ ciency
is maintained through trade as we now show.
Specically, given a competitive market price, pt, countries may choose to
buy carbon debt and be paid to do so or to sell them, by paying others to
8Setting a number of permits is tantamount to choosing a discount factor and to adopting
a specic prediction of future climate damage. Thus, from this perspective, a global cap-
and-trade program is actually closer to centralization than to decentralization (even though
e¢ ciency calls against the fragmentation of permit markets).
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hold debt in their stead.
Proposition 2 Consider a carbon liabilities scheme where installments are set
to current marginal climate damage: t =
@Dt
@Zt
. Allowing carbon debt to be
traded maintains e¢ ciency while decentralizing preferences and beliefs.
Proof. We show that e¢ ciency is robust to heterogeneity in countries
discount factors. The proof assuming countries formulate di¤erent expectations
about future damage, Eit , proceeds similarly.
Suppose countries have heterogeneous discount factors. Assume country j
sells Y jt units of the debt associated to its current emissons, X
j
t + Y
j
t . Its
expected net present benet writes as follows:
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+1X
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where cjt is the cost of holding nancial debt for country j at date t and
Zjt = Z
j
t 1 +X
j
t
is the amount of carbon debt held by country j at date t. The sole purpose of
introducing a cost of holding nancial debt is to ensure an interior solution. We
interpret it as country default risk and therefore assume it to be negligible for
usual levels of debt. We assume cjt to be increasing, strictly convex, and such
that cjt (0) = 0.
Similarly, assume country i purchases Y it units of debt, as measured in carbon
stock units. Its expected net present benet writes as follows:
Bi =
+1X
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tiE0
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,
where the carbon stock for which country i is considered to be responsible now
writes:
Zit = Z
i
t 1 +X
i
t + Y
i
t
From the point of view of a net seller of carbon debt, the rst-order conditions
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write as follows:
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From the point of view of a net buyer of carbon debt, the rst-order conditions
are the following:
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It follows that, for all i:
@Bit
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= pt,
and for all j
pt =
@Bjt
@Y jt
=
@Bjt
@Xjt
,
yielding e¢ ciency.
Proposition 2 can be seen as an analog of the First Welfare Theorem, whereby
allowing carbon debt to be traded yields allocative e¢ ciency through decentral-
ization.9 Furthemore, another consequence of Proposition 2 is that our scheme
allows for diverging opinions regarding climate change. It is also noteworthy
that our mechanism is robust in the sense of being immune to strategic ma-
9 It would be interesting to explore whether an equivalent of the Second Welfare Theorem
holds. For an attempt to conjugate allocative e¢ ciency with the redistributive aspects of
global warming, see Billette de Villemeur and Leroux (2011).
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nipulation both in the discount factor and in the expectations because the nal
allocation of debt is a competitive market outcome. To sum up, the introduction
of a market for carbon debt makes our mechanism robust to misrepresentation
and to misreporting.
Morever:
Remark 3 Because our scheme nancializes the carbon debt, failure to honor
the latter is now no di¤erent than a default in the repayment of nancial debt.
If countries take part in this scheme, they are unlikely to renege on their
participation. Naturally, there is the question of whether countries will partic-
ipate in the rst place, leading to the general theme of coalition formation in
international environmental agreements. Because the expected net discounted
payo¤s of countries are identical under our approach as with an optimal carbon
tax, we do not expect to obtain in our setting markedly di¤erent conclusions
from those of that litterature. Of course, those very important questions deserve
to be addressed more carefully, which we leave to future work.
4 Liability
Although there is some evidence that climate change already has an impact
on economic outcomes, climate damage remains highly uncertain and volatile.
It follows that ex ante approaches to climate policy exhibit the unappealing
feature of possibly requiring high payments when realized damage is low. A
liability approach avoid this disconnectedness by linking payments to realized
harm.10
The key feature of our mechanism is that the prospect of being liable for
future damage creates incentives to reduce emissions today. It is a general
principle of justice that no party can be liable in the absence of "constructive
notice".11 In other words, a country should not be asked to pay for the climate
consequences of emissions made before the discovery of the impact of greenhouse
gases on the climate. As already mentioned, however, our mechanism does not
require tracing back emissions to innity, but can account for anthropogenic
10 In tort law, one aspect of the debate between the regulatory and the liability approaches
we did not yet mention is the fact that payments reect realized harm in the latter whereas
they are based on the possibility of harm in the former. On this, see Shavell (1984, 2011) and
Kolstad et al (1990).
11We thank Shi-Ling Hsu for bringing this issue to our attention.
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emissions starting at some agreed-upon reference date only. It thus does not
violate this basic legal principle.12
Because it requires a consensus only on the principle and on a starting date,
one can expect an agreement to be more easily reached with a liability approach
than with taxation. Indeed, the latter requires a consensus on the magnitude of
yet unrealized climate events far o¤ in the future, a much more ambitious goal.
We now turn to a formal presentation of our liability scheme. Assume that
payments are adjusted according to realized damage, D (Zt). More precisely,
assume that countries are actually required to pay tZ
i
tIDt , where
IDt =
D (Zt)
Et [D (Zt)]
is the ratio of the realized over the expected damage.13
Proposition 4 The liability rule tZ
i
tIDt is rst-best e¢ cient, robust and yields
payments proportional to realized climate damage.
Proof. By denition, Es [IDt ] = 1 for all s  t, so that expected payments
are unchanged. Hence, from Proposition 1, the liability rule is rst-best e¢ cient.
For the same reason, from Proposition 2, it is robust to misrepresentation and
deviations. Furthermore, tZ
i
tIDt is indeed proportional to realized harm:
tZ
i
tIDt =
dDt
dZt
Zit
Dt (Zt)
Et [D (Zt)]
=
Zit
Zt
(dDt=dZt)
Et [Dt (Zt) =Zt]
Dt (Zt) .
If the damage function, Dt, were linear, payments would exactly cover total
damage and countries would pay in proportion to their emission contributions:
tZ
i
tIDt =
Zit
Zt
Dt (Zt). If the damage function is convex, total payments add
up to more than the realized damage because rst-best e¢ ciency requires going
beyond full liability.14
12Obviously, for incentives to exist, "actual notice" is also needed; i.e., countries must not
only be aware of the fact that they are causing harm (constructive notice), but must also be
informed that they will be considered liable for future climate damage.
13Expectation is assumed to be taken at the beginning of the period.
14The incompatibility between rst-best e¢ ciency and budget balance is well-known. See,
e.g., Billette de Villemeur and Leroux (2011).
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Remark 5 Full liability constitutes a conservative policy where payments rely
only on realized damage, and not even on some estimate of the marginal dam-
age function. In Europe and in the U.S., the eld of environmental damage
estimation is already well developed.
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